It’s simply irrelevant. If you believe this theory exactly nothing changes about what you can predict about the world. That’s what knowledge is all about. If you have a theory that doesn’t behave differently under some different circumstances, you’ve essentially said nothing.
Also reminds me a bit of the chapter in “Surely you’re joking, Mr. Feynman!” called “Is Electricity Fire?”, if someone knows that.
There’s nothing wrong with speculation as long as everyone knows that’s what going on.
Take the work of Julian Jaynes for example; it’s fringe, it’s speculative, but he’s asking questions that nobody else asked before and that in itself is worthwhile because it can pave the way for better questions which are falsifiable.
Consider math, it doesn’t make any empirical predictions on its own, as it is just a set of abstract symbols and rules. Do you consider mathematical facts to be a form of knowledge?
Arguably “it’s impossible to violate energy conservation given time-invariant action” is an empirical prediction, and that’s a specific case of Noether’s theorem.
Yeah, this isn’t really a theory yet. That doesn’t necessarily mean it’s an invalid concept, though. For example, if game theory turned up in fundamental physics somehow, wouldn’t that suggest intelligence might be more fundamental than we assumed?
It’s simply irrelevant. If you believe this theory exactly nothing changes about what you can predict about the world. That’s what knowledge is all about. If you have a theory that doesn’t behave differently under some different circumstances, you’ve essentially said nothing.
Also reminds me a bit of the chapter in “Surely you’re joking, Mr. Feynman!” called “Is Electricity Fire?”, if someone knows that.
There’s nothing wrong with speculation as long as everyone knows that’s what going on.
Take the work of Julian Jaynes for example; it’s fringe, it’s speculative, but he’s asking questions that nobody else asked before and that in itself is worthwhile because it can pave the way for better questions which are falsifiable.
Consider math, it doesn’t make any empirical predictions on its own, as it is just a set of abstract symbols and rules. Do you consider mathematical facts to be a form of knowledge?
Arguably “it’s impossible to violate energy conservation given time-invariant action” is an empirical prediction, and that’s a specific case of Noether’s theorem.
Yeah, this isn’t really a theory yet. That doesn’t necessarily mean it’s an invalid concept, though. For example, if game theory turned up in fundamental physics somehow, wouldn’t that suggest intelligence might be more fundamental than we assumed?