I’m new to the container world. Does it have any security benefits when I run my applications as a non-root user in a docker container? And how about Podman? There I’ll run the container as an unprivileged user anyway. Would changing the user in the container achieve anything?
tl;dr, yes, it does.
Containers are nothing like VMs, and containers in Linux are basically a combination of a feature called Cgroups, which allows to restrict the resources (like memory, etc.) available to a process or group of processes, and namespaces. Namespaces are a construct in which certain namespaced resources are separated from each other, and processes can only see those belonging to their namespace. A simple example is a mount namespace. When you launch a container, you see a / directory which is not the root directory of your system.
Now, the problem is, that not all the resources are namespaced, so there is still quite a lot that processes within containers can do interacting with the main system resources, especially if they are root.
A root process within a container generally can do lots of things that the actual root process can do outside of it. For example, mounting parts of the filesystem (if you run with --privileged), loading kernel modules, etc. Podman can run rootless, in the sense that it uses also User namespaces, meaning a user 0 (root) inside a container is actually mapped to something else outside, but also docker nowadays can do the same.
So yeah, in general, running the applications with the less amount of privileges is a good idea and you should do it whenever you can. Even if you do need some privileges, you should add only the Capabilities needed, not just go straight to root.
It means that if someone breaks out of your container, they can only do things that user can do.
Can that user access your private documents (are these documents in a container that also runs under that user)?
Can that user sudo?
Can that user access SSH keys and jump to other computers?
Generally speaking, the answer to all of these should be “no”, meaning that each group of containers (or risk levels etc) get their own account.
Process UIDs do the exact same thing.
I have seen this post and decided to respond via a separate blog post. https://loudwhisper.me/blog/containers-isolation/
The short answer is that yes, they do. And yes lowering the privileges of the user helps in avoiding container escapes, which basically makes the other advantages for containers valid. You can, however, achieve the same using (relatively obscure, imho) systemd settings, running with flatpak etc. Namespaces + Cgroups + Seccomp + Capabilities = better security. Containers make it easy to use all of the above.
Imagine your containers as very lightweight mini-VMs. Would you run everything as root in your virtual machines? Containers aren’t really that different to classical VMs from an operations point of view. You have a different attack surface, but it is still there, and running as a non-root user inside the container reduces this attack surface, and should IMHO be the default. Privileged containers and users may be required for specific purposes, but should not be the norm, if possible.
This comment shows misunderstanding of what container and virtual machines are and how the technology behind each concept works. Containers are NOT virtual machines, do not treat them as such.
You’re right, containers are not VMs, and I’ve never claimed that. For the matter of basic unix access control for a beginner they are similar enough to treat them as such. It’s enough of a baseline for basic security for a beginners workload imo. For advanced use cases - absolutely do not treat containers as you would VMs.
Container are not a security concept. Hence, running things inside of a container does not provide any security benefits as opposed to outside of the container.
In actual fact, if you take the time to configure you services with proper systemd security features, you get more secure environments than with running generic containers with “just” unprivileged users.
Not really true, containers are based on namespaces which have always been also a security feature. Chroot has been a common “system” technique, afterall.
Containers help security if built properly, and it’s easier to build a container securely (and run them), compared to proper SystemD unit security.
containers are based on namespaces which have always been also a security feature.
Incorrect.
Chroot has been a common “system” technique, afterall.
Incorrect.
OK :)
So chroot has not been used to isolate processes for decades to a confined view of the filesystem (especially in combo with a restricted shell), and for example the networking namespace is not used to limit the impact on a compromise on the firewall, the user namespace is not used to allow privileged processes to run de-facto unprivileged.
Whatever you say
EDIT: Actually, if you are really convinced of what you are saying we can do the following experiment:
- We spin up a VPS and run a web application with a RCE with a Systemd unit and run the same web app in a
scratchcontainer running under an unprivileged user
Then we can compare the kind of impact that using containers to wrap applications has on the security of the system. My guess, even with a full RCE you will not be able to escape the container.
Half-jokes aside, my stance is that isolation (namespacing and cgroups) allows to greatly reduce the attack surface and contain the blast radius of a compromise, which are security benefits. You can easily have a container with no shell, no binaries at all, no writable paths, read-only filesystem etc. You can do at least some of those things even in a regular Linux box of course, but it is much more uncommon, much harder, much less convenient (for example, no writeable /tmp is going to break a lot of stuff), much more error prone, etc.
Your stance i.e.:
running things inside of a container does not provide any security benefits as opposed to outside of the container
is way too absolute, imo.
- We spin up a VPS and run a web application with a RCE with a Systemd unit and run the same web app in a
[citation needed]
