The reconfiguration of the global energy map occupies a central place in contemporary geopolitical disputes. Wars, economic sanctions, maritime blockades, and trade tensions are all part of a scenario in which control over oil and gas has a strategic dimension. This is the central theme of the article “ How the United States Carried Out Armed Robbery of the World’s Energy Supply and Created the Petro-Gasdollar ,” published by journalist and researcher Richard Medhurst on May 1, 2026.

Throughout the text, Medhurst argues that Washington has promoted a strategy in recent years aimed at consolidating control over the global oil and gas market, using mechanisms of political pressure, military operations and economic sanctions directed against energy competitors and actors associated with the multipolar bloc.

From petrodollar to petrogasdollar

The United States has transformed its strategy for global energy dominance around liquefied natural gas and control of maritime supply routes. Under this interpretation, the war in Ukraine and the subsequent reconfiguration of the European energy market marked a turning point for Washington.

The changing energy landscape even altered the historical relationship between the United States and oil crises. For decades, high oil prices posed a problem for the US economy due to its dependence on energy imports. That logic changed after the expansion of US production of oil, gas, and refined products. Medhurst says:

“Today, they are the world’s largest producers of oil, gas and refined products, and the world’s leading exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG).”

From there, the article argues that the global rise in energy prices began to directly benefit Wall Street and US energy corporations. Washington stopped perceiving energy crises as threats and began to turn them into opportunities for profitability and geopolitical repositioning.

The sanctions against Russia and the destruction of the Nord Stream pipelines allowed Russia’s energy supply to shift to Europe and opened up space for American liquefied natural gas, representing a structural change. “The United States went from supplying only 9% of Europe’s energy to becoming the main European source of coal, oil, and LNG,” the journalist notes.

The text also interprets statements made at various times by figures such as Joe Biden and Condoleezza Rice regarding European “energy dependence” as part of a deliberate policy aimed at consolidating a captive market for US gas. Under this interpretation, the elimination of Nord Stream would have had a long-term economic and strategic objective.

“By sanctioning Moscow and destroying the Nord Stream pipelines, the United States not only harmed Russia, but also turned Europe into a permanent American customer.”

Another relevant aspect is the idea that Washington did not need to rapidly expand its energy infrastructure to consolidate its dominant position. Medhurst argues that the strategy consisted of reducing the operational capacity of its direct competitors within the global LNG market.

In this context, the article places the events related to Qatar and Australia within the same geopolitical sequence. The partial disruption of both countries’ export capabilities ultimately drove up international gas prices and strengthened the United States’ position in the global energy market.

The energy war against competitors

The investigation describes a sequence of events that reflects an offensive aimed at displacing the United States’ main energy competitors. Russia, Qatar, and Iran are all caught in the same pressure scenario, linked to control of the global liquefied natural gas market and supply routes to Europe and Asia.

Qatar’s situation during the war with Iran exemplifies this well. The partial shutdown of operations at Ras Laffan immediately altered the balance of the international LNG market. Medhurst points out that “Washington eliminated the world’s largest gas field, crippling Iran and marginalizing Qatar in one fell swoop.”

Qatar was forced to suspend long-term energy contracts with several international buyers, a situation that ultimately redirected some of the demand toward US gas. The immediate consequence was a price increase concentrated mainly in Europe and Asia.

“In the span of just 9 days, the United States saw its two biggest competitors exit the market,” says Medhurst.

These events are linked to decisions made by the European Union regarding Russian gas. Medhurst points out that on the same day Qatar reduced part of its export capacity, Brussels moved forward with new restrictions on spot purchases of Russian gas. The simultaneous nature of these two processes ultimately benefited US LNG exporters.

The Levantine Basin occupies another important focus of the analysis. The United States and Israel have made progress in an energy reorganization of the eastern Mediterranean linked to the fields located off the coasts of Syria, Palestine, and Lebanon. The text interprets the development of the EastMed-Poseidon corridor as a geopolitical replacement for Nord Stream.

“Washington had built a veritable American artery stretching from the Levant to Cyprus and Greece.”

The article focuses particularly on Chevron’s role in this regional reconfiguration, mentioning gas agreements signed with Israel, Greece, and Cyprus, as well as subsequent moves involving Syrian energy infrastructure. The research argues that these operations are part of a single strategy of corporate consolidation and territorial control over gas reserves in the Mediterranean.

“The northern gas pipeline from Russia had become inoperative, and a new one, almost perfectly symmetrical, was built in its place,” the journalist says.

The situation in Gaza also appears within this geopolitical framework. “This war was never about hostages or Hamas, but about the plundering of Gaza’s resources,” explains Medhurst, linking control over the Levantine basin to energy projects associated with offshore gas platforms and questioning the role played by organizations established after the ceasefire. The future exploitation of these resources constitutes one of the structural factors behind the conflict.

The objective of these operations is not limited to the European market. “The real target is China,” he says. Washington is trying to restrict Beijing’s energy access by pressuring strategic suppliers and controlling maritime corridors.

Venezuela, China and the dispute over strategic reserves

In this global energy dispute, Venezuela is directly linked to China and the reconfiguration of the international oil market. Washington seeks to limit Chinese access to suppliers considered strategic, including Venezuela, Russia, and Iran.

Medhurst points out that “China gets about a third of its oil from Venezuela, Russia, and Iran combined.” Therefore, the pressure on these countries is part of a strategy aimed at restricting Beijing’s room for maneuver within the global energy system.

“By cutting off Beijing’s most vital fuel sources, the United States intends to force total dependence on American energy,” he adds.

In the Venezuelan case, the investigation mentions the sequence of military, financial, and maritime operations that began in the second half of 2016 with the deployment of US ships in the Caribbean under the pretext of alleged anti-drug operations. This naval presence ultimately functioned as a mechanism to control the export of Venezuelan oil.

The operation subsequently evolved into a scheme of more direct control over Venezuelan oil trade. Medhurst notes that the US Navy began deciding which vessels could enter or leave Venezuelan waters and links this situation to Chevron’s interests in the country’s oil reserves.

“This acquisition achieved two crucial objectives for the Pirate State: first, it immediately cut off China’s access to a vital energy partner.” Second, it secured an oil reserve under US control amid the escalating conflict with Russia and Iran.

The text also elaborates on the Russian situation. The United States and NATO have increased operations against shipping lanes used by Moscow to export oil to Asia. The article mentions attacks against ships, refineries, and export centers during the first months of 2026. “We are witnessing a physical war for energy.”

The actions against Russian infrastructure coincided with the consolidation of pressure mechanisms against Iran. Washington seeks to hinder Tehran’s ability to sustain exports to China amidst the war and attacks on energy and maritime infrastructure.

The article cites official Chinese figures to support the claim that natural gas imports saw a significant drop during the first months of 2026. This decline reflects the cumulative impact of sanctions, blockades, and conflicts on Beijing’s main energy suppliers.

Pressure on Venezuela, Russia, and Iran also aims to weaken economic initiatives driven by the BRICS and China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Energy control has become a central instrument in the struggle for international order. “This gives them the necessary leverage to ensure the dollar’s survival, while simultaneously weakening the BRICS.”

The pirate state and the new architecture of global control

The final part of Richard Medhurst’s article develops a broader thesis on the transformation of US power on the international stage: Washington has left behind traditional mechanisms of economic hegemony and is moving towards more direct forms of coercion linked to maritime, energy and financial control.

“We are witnessing the United States’ transition from an empire to a lawless pirate state.” Medhurst uses the concept of a “pirate state” to describe a system based on naval blockades, extraterritorial sanctions, and corporate control over strategic supply chains. American energy policy no longer relies solely on markets or trade agreements, but on the military capacity to secure shipping routes, restrict competitors, and manage global flows of oil and gas.

This is where the strengthening of US maritime infrastructure comes in. Medhurst analyzes the so-called Maritime Action Plan (MAP), published by the White House in 2026, as part of a project aimed at transforming energy and commercial transport into a space dominated by US fleets.

The MAP progressively mandates the use of US-built vessels to transport strategic cargo, including hydrocarbons and liquefied natural gas. This model seeks to consolidate a logistical dependency network around international energy trade.

The research also examines the relationship between energy corporations, the military, and financial power. Chevron is consistently linked to operations involving oil and gas fields in various regions, while the U.S. Navy secures maritime corridors and extraction areas. This coordination represents a new phase of U.S. power over global resources. “Everything we see today is the result of decades of planning between Washington and Wall Street,” says Medhurst.

This strategy is connected to documents developed since the early 2000s within the Bush administration. Medhurst recalls the meetings promoted by Dick Cheney with large energy corporations and cites excerpts from the 2001 National Energy Policy to argue that control over reserves in the Western Hemisphere, especially those in Venezuela, had been part of Washington’s strategic objectives for decades.

The text interprets the Donroe Doctrine as a policy aimed at shifting the center of the global energy corridor to the Western Hemisphere under US leadership. Within this framework, recent wars, sanctions, and maritime blockades are seen as following the same logic of reorganizing the international energy system.

“The petrodollar no longer exists. It has been quietly replaced by a far more lethal successor: the petro-gasdollar,” Medhurst asserts. The conflicts unfolding in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Latin America are part of the same struggle for global energy supply and for the ability to maintain the dollar’s ​​financial centrality in a context of geopolitical transition.